CVE-2025-68260: The Linux Kernel’s First Rust-Code CVE in rust_binder, Root Cause, Exposure Checks, and Fix Strategy

CVE-2025-68260 has been widely described as the first CVE assigned to Rust code in the mainline Linux kernel. The vulnerability sits in the Rust-based Android Binder driver (rust_binder) and is described as a crash-class bug: a race condition that can corrupt intrusive linked-list pointers and trigger kernel oops/panic (denial of service).

This matters for security teams for two reasons. First, “crash-only” kernel bugs still cause real operational impact—especially in high-availability or multi-tenant environments. Second, the exposure is configuration-dependent: many Linux systems won’t be affected unless the Rust Binder implementation is enabled and used.

Executive Summary for Security Engineers

• CVE: CVE-2025-68260
• Component: Linux kernel Rust Android Binder driver (rust_binder), involving Node::release そして death_list handling
• Bug class: Race condition + unsafe intrusive list manipulation → pointer corruption
• Impact: Kernel crash / DoS (publicly described)
• Exposure depends on: Whether Rust Binder is enabled/selected (e.g., ANDROID_BINDER_IPC_RUST, binder.impl)
• NVD status: “Awaiting Analysis” at time of writing (CVSS may be pending)

What CVE-2025-68260 Is: A Concurrency Bug in the Rust Binder Driver

The NVD record describes a specific unsafe removal operation on an intrusive linked list. The operation is safe only if no other thread can concurrently touch the element’s prev/next pointers. The failure happens when a lock-dropping pattern in Node::release overlaps with a concurrent unsafe remove, leading to linked-list corruption and crashes.

NVD includes a representative kernel crash symptom (“Unable to handle kernel paging request…”) associated with the corrupted list pointers, consistent with a crash-class vulnerability rather than a subtle logic flaw.

A short conceptual sketch of the problematic pattern (for intuition, not as an exploit) looks like this:

// Conceptual sketch (not full kernel code):
lock(death_list);
move_all_items_to_local_list();
unlock(death_list);

// Iterate without the lock
for item in local_list {
    // process item
}

// Concurrent thread may do:
unsafe { death_list.remove(item) } // touches prev/next pointers
// => data race => pointer corruption => kernel crash

The key is the concurrency invariant: touching intrusive list pointers safely requires exclusive access guarantees, and those guarantees fail when list elements can be modified in parallel during lock-free traversal.

Why This Became the “First Rust Kernel CVE”

Greg Kroah-Hartman (stable maintainer) publicly characterized this as the first kernel CVE for Rust code, emphasizing that the issue “just causes a crash” and does not represent a demonstrated path to weaponizable memory corruption.

That framing is operationally useful: it helps security teams triage the bug as an availability risk with configuration-dependent exposure, while avoiding overstatement about exploitability.

Affected Systems: Version Timeline and Config Reality

Two facts anchor the timeline and exposure model:

1. The Rust Android Binder driver was merged into Linux v6.18-rc1, according to the Rust for Linux project documentation.
2. Android kernel configuration explicitly supports selecting a Binder implementation, including a Rust variant. The Kconfig documentation references binder.impl as the kernel command-line knob used to choose the implementation and includes options governing the default.

This means exposure is not “all Linux.” A generic server fleet may never enable Rust Binder. But Android-focused kernels, dev machines running Android container stacks, or custom builds that enable the Rust Binder implementation should treat CVE-2025-68260 as actionable.

Binder itself is a foundational Android IPC mechanism, widely documented by Android’s architecture materials.

Quick Exposure Checks (Auditable, No Exploit Content)

Use these commands to determine whether your environment is in scope.

Kernel version

uname -r

Kernel config: Rust + Binder + Rust Binder

# Distro-style /boot config (common on many systems)
grep -E "CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_IPC(_RUST)?|CONFIG_RUST" /boot/config-$(uname -r) 2>/dev/null

# If /proc/config.gz is enabled
zcat /proc/config.gz 2>/dev/null | grep -E "CONFIG_ANDROID_BINDER_IPC(_RUST)?|CONFIG_RUST"

Binder implementation selection (Android kernels often use binder.impl)

cat /proc/cmdline | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^binder\.impl='

について binder.impl parameter is documented in the Android kernel Kconfig as part of implementation selection behavior.

Crash signal hunting (symptoms only)

dmesg -T | egrep -i "rust_binder|binder|Unable to handle|paging request|Oops|KASAN" | tail -n 200

Remediation Strategy: Upgrade First, Backport Only with Real CI

The safest approach is to move to a stable kernel release containing the fix. The public coverage emphasizes upgrading to stable kernels rather than cherry-picking isolated commits, consistent with kernel stability and testing practices.

The NVD record includes references to kernel.org sources that track the fix context.

If you run a custom Android kernel and cannot immediately upgrade, the engineering path is typically: backport the fix into your maintained patchset and validate on Binder-heavy workloads. For most enterprises, however, the pragmatic choice is: consume vendor updates (distro/OEM/GKI channel) and document the remediation evidence.

Triage Table

Context: Related Kernel CVEs for Prioritization

CVE-2025-68260 is described publicly as crash-class. For prioritization, many organizations benchmark against kernel CVEs with clearer privilege impact:

• CVE-2019-2215 (Android Binder UAF / EoP): NVD describes an elevation of privilege via a Binder use-after-free; Project Zero provides detailed analysis.
• CVE-2022-0847 (“Dirty Pipe”): widely tracked for local privilege escalation; CISA issued an alert.
• CVE-2024-1086 (nf_tables UAF / LPE): NVD and Red Hat summarize LPE potential from a use-after-free in netfilter/nf_tables.

The practical takeaway: treat CVE-2025-68260 as high priority when Binder/Rust Binder is in active use and crashes are business-impacting; otherwise, don’t let the “first Rust CVE” headline displace more broadly reachable LPE-class kernel issues.

Operationalizing the Response with Penligent

For configuration-dependent kernel CVEs, the bottleneck is rarely reading the advisory—it’s producing defensible, scalable answers to “where are we exposed” and “did the fix actually land.” Penligent can streamline this cycle by turning CVE-2025-68260 into a repeatable evidence workflow: collect kernel versions and config signals across assets, group hosts by Rust Binder enablement and binder.impl selection, and generate an audit-ready remediation report with supporting references. This approach is designed for verification and closure, not exploitation.

NVD: CVE-2025-68260
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68260

Greg Kroah-Hartman notice (crash framing; first Rust kernel CVE)
https://social.kernel.org/notice/B1JLrtkxEBazCPQHDM

SecurityOnline coverage
https://securityonline.info/rusts-first-breach-cve-2025-68260-marks-the-first-rust-vulnerability-in-the-linux-kernel/

Rust for Linux: Android Binder Driver (merged into v6.18-rc1)
https://rust-for-linux.com/android-binder-driver

Android kernel Kconfig (Binder Rust options; binder.impl selection)
https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/android15-6.6-2024-07_r44/drivers/android/Kconfig

Android docs: Binder IPC overview
https://source.android.com/docs/core/architecture/hidl/binder-ipc

NVD: CVE-2019-2215
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2215

Project Zero RCA: CVE-2019-2215
https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2019/CVE-2019-2215.html

NVD: CVE-2022-0847
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0847

CISA alert: Dirty Pipe
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2022/03/10/dirty-pipe-privilege-escalation-vulnerability-linux

NVD: CVE-2024-1086
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-1086

Red Hat: CVE-2024-1086
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2024-1086