The landscape of browser exploitation shifted fundamentally in 2025. For years, the narrative was dominated by “Use-After-Free” (UAF) bugs in the DOM (Document Object Model). However, with the maturation of Google’s MiraclePtr (a raw pointer protection mechanism) and the widespread enforcement of the V8 Sandbox, the bar for successful exploitation has been raised to an unprecedented level.
Attackers—specifically advanced APT groups and commercial surveillance vendors—have adapted. The exploits of 2025 were not simple crashes; they were elegant, multi-stage kill chains. They combined V8 Type Confusion to compromise the renderer, leveraged the ANGLE graphics layer to gain privileged GPU access, and abused Mojo IPC logic to escape the sandbox.
This article provides a hardcore technical analysis of these vectors, focusing on CVE-2025-14174 (ANGLE), CVE-2025-13223 (V8), and the logical sandbox escape CVE-2025-2783, while exploring how AI-driven automated exploitation is becoming the only way to detect these complex chains before they hit the wild.
The New Attack Surface: ANGLE and CVE-2025-14174
Vulnerability: Out-of-Bounds Write in Metal Backend
Component: ANGLE (Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine)
Impact: GPU Process Code Execution
While V8 gets the headlines, the graphics stack has become the soft underbelly of browser security. CVE-2025-14174, disclosed in December 2025, targeted ANGLE—Chrome’s abstraction layer that translates WebGL/WebGPU calls into native system APIs (DirectX, OpenGL, Metal, Vulkan).
The Technical Mechanics
The vulnerability resided specifically in ANGLE’s translation of WebGL calls to Apple’s Metal API. When a web page initiates a texImage2D call, ANGLE must calculate the memory stride and padding to map the texture into the GPU’s memory space.
In CVE-2025-14174, the calculation for pixelsDepthPitch (used in 3D textures) suffered from an integer overflow when specific packing alignment parameters (GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT) were combined with extreme texture dimensions.
The Exploit Primitive:
- Heap Feng Shui: The attacker sprays the GPU process heap with
SharedMemoryobjects to align memory chunks. - Gatilho: A specific WebGL draw call triggers the overflow, writing attacker-controlled texture data past the bounds of the allocated buffer.
- Corruption: The overflow overwrites the
vtablepointer of a C++ object residing in the adjacent heap chunk. - Execution: When the GPU process attempts to destruct or use that object, it calls a function pointer now controlled by the attacker.
Why This Matters:
The GPU process is a privileged target. Unlike the heavily restricted Renderer process, the GPU process interacts directly with kernel-level drivers and windowing systems. Gaining RCE here often bypasses several layers of OS mitigation.
The Classic Evolved: V8 Type Confusion (CVE-2025-13223)
Vulnerability: JIT Optimization Flaw
Component: V8 Engine (TurboFan)
Impact: Renderer RCE (Inside V8 Sandbox)
Despite the V8 Sandbox attempting to isolate the heap, V8 Type Confusion remains the primary method for gaining initial read/write primitives. CVE-2025-13223 highlights a failure in the TurboFan optimization pipeline.
The CheckMaps Failure
TurboFan optimizes JavaScript by making assumptions about object types (Maps). If code accesses an array of integers repeatedly, TurboFan compiles machine code optimized for integers. To ensure safety, it inserts CheckMaps nodes.
CVE-2025-13223 was a Redundancy Elimination error. The optimizer incorrectly determined that a CheckMaps node was redundant and removed it, even though a side-effect in a previous function call could alter the object’s Map.
The Conceptual Exploit:
JavaScript
`function vulnerable_opt(arr, trigger_obj) { // 1. TurboFan sees arr is an array of Doubles. let x = arr[0];
// 2. Side-effect: This function changes 'arr' to an array of Objects.
// However, TurboFan removed the Map check after this call due to the bug.
trigger_obj.toString();
// 3. Type Confusion: TurboFan writes a float, but memory is now Object pointers.
// We write a controlled float value (0x4141...) which is interpreted as a pointer.
arr[1] = 1.337e-308;
}`
Defeating the V8 Sandbox
In 2025, getting addrOf e fakeObj primitives is no longer enough because of the V8 Sandbox. This security mechanism “cages” the V8 heap, meaning an attacker can only corrupt memory inside the sandbox. They cannot overwrite return addresses on the stack or modify partition allocators outside the cage.
To weaponize CVE-2025-13223, attackers used it to corrupt a WasmInstanceObject. By modifying the jump table of a WebAssembly instance (which resides inside the sandbox), they could redirect execution to arbitrary shellcode compiled via JIT, effectively gaining arbitrary code execution within the renderer’s constraints.
The Escape: Mojo IPC Logic Bugs (CVE-2025-2783)
Vulnerability: Inadequate Permission Validation
Component: Mojo IPC (Inter-Process Communication)
Impact: Sandbox Escape (Full System Compromise)
With the renderer compromised, the attacker is still trapped in the sandbox. This is where Mojo IPC comes in. Mojo is the high-performance IPC system Chrome uses for communication between the untrusted Renderer and the privileged Browser Process.
CVE-2025-2783 was not a memory corruption bug; it was a logic flaw in the implementation of the FileSystemAccess interface.
The Interface Definition Language (IDL) Flaw
Chrome defines IPC interfaces using .mojom files. The vulnerability existed in a method meant to grant read access to temporary files.
C++
// Vulnerable Logic in Browser Process void OnRequestFileAccess(int32 render_frame_id, String file_path) { // FLAW: The browser checked if the path was "safe" (e.g., no ../) // BUT it did not verify if the renderer *owned* the file_path. // An attacker could request access to profile data or cookies. GrantAccess(file_path); }
The Exploit Chain:
- Compromise Renderer: Use CVE-2025-13223 to execute native code.
- Hook Mojo: Locate the Mojo dispatch tables in memory.
- Forge Message: Construct a raw Mojo message calling
OnRequestFileAccesswith a path pointing to sensitive user data (e.g.,Login DataSQLite DB). - Exfiltrate: Since the browser process executes the file read with high privileges, it returns the file handle to the renderer, bypassing OS file permissions.
This represents the “Logic Era” of browser exploitation: using valid features in invalid ways to cross security boundaries.
The Future of Detection: AI-Driven Primitive Synthesis
The complexity of these chains—specifically the leap from a V8 heap corruption to a stable primitive, and then to a Mojo logic abuse—is outpacing human manual analysis. Fuzzers are good at finding crashes, not logic bugs.
This is the operational domain of Penligent.ai.
Automated Exploit Generation (AEG)
Penligent shifts the paradigm from “Vulnerability Scanning” to “Automated Exploit Generation.”
- Heap Layout Synthesis: For vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-14174 (ANGLE), Penligent’s AI agents analyze the heap allocator’s behavior to automatically determine the precise sequence of allocations (Spraying) needed to place a target object next to the overflow buffer. It solves the “Heap Feng Shui” puzzle mathematically.
- IDL Logic Reasoning: For Mojo exploits (CVE-2025-2783), Penligent parses the entire Chrome codebase’s
.mojomdefinitions. It builds a dependency graph of IPC calls and uses Reinforcement Learning (RL) to identify sequences of valid messages that result in privileged state changes.
By automating the construction of the full kill chain—from primitive to escape—Penligent provides the only reliable way to validate if a patch actually breaks the exploit path or merely fixes the symptom.
Conclusion and Mitigation Strategies
The 2025 Chrome zero-day landscape teaches us that the “Hardening” era works, but it pushes attackers toward logic bugs and subsystem abuse.
Hardcore Defense Strategy:
- Strict Site Isolation: Ensure
Strict-Origin-Isolationis enabled to prevent cross-origin data leaks even if the renderer is compromised. - Disable WebGL/WebGPU in Critical Zones: For high-security internal portals, use enterprise policies to disable hardware acceleration, effectively neutralizing the ANGLE attack surface (CVE-2025-14174).
- IPC Monitoring: Defensive teams must start monitoring internal IPC traffic. EDRs rarely look at Mojo messages, but that is exactly where the breakout happens.
The battle has moved from the stack and heap to the logic gates of the browser’s architecture. Security engineers must adapt their tooling and mindset accordingly.
